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Ronald Dworkin's The Moral Reading of
the Constitution: A Critiquet
RAOUL BERGER*
Constitutions are not designed for metaphysical or logical subtleties ... for
elaborate shades of meaning, or for the exercise of philosophical acuteness
or... extraordinary gloss.'
-Justice Story
Ronald Dworkin, a professor of jurisprudence and the guru of activist deep
thinkers, proposes a "moral reading of the Constitution."2 The "moral reading,"
he acknowledges, "seems intellectually and politically discreditable"; "to many
lawyers and political scientists," it "will appear extravagant . . . [and] even
perverse."4 He admits it is "often dismissed as an 'extreme' view ...
[M]ainstream constitutional theory... wholly rejects that reading,"5 and it is
"often explicitly condemned."6 So it "would... be revolutionary for a judge
openly to recognize th[at] moral reading." These convictions reflect those of the
people; as John Hart Ely noted, "[o]ur society does not, rightly does not, accept
the notion of a discoverable and objectively valid set of moral principles... that
could plausibly serve to overturn the decisions of our elected representatives." 8
"Morals," as will appear, offer frail footing for displacement of our "government
by consent" by government by judiciary. Dworkin unfurls the banner of
revolution.
To import his moral reading "into the heart of constitutional law," Dworkin
instances recognition by the First Amendment of "a moral principle-that it is
wrong for government to censor [what an individual says]."9 To rely for a "moral
reading" on the proposition that censorship is "wrong," that is, "morally
unjust,"'" is to engage in circular reasoning. Free speech is a relatively recent
t © 1997 by Raoul Berger.
* Author, inter alia, of Impeachment, Executive Privilege, Government by Judiciary,
Death Penalties, and numerous articles.
1. 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONsTTUmoN OF THE UNITED STATES § 451
(Melville M. Bigelow ed., 5th ed., Little, Brown, & Co. 1905) (1833).
2. Ronald Dworkin, The Moral Reading of the Constitution, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Mar. 21,
1996, at 46, 46. This article was later reproduced as part of the introduction to RONALD
DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERiCAN CONSTmTUTION (1996).
3. Dworkin, supra note 2, at 46.
4. Id. at 47.
5. Id at46.
6.Id. at 50.
7.Id. at46.
8. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 54 (1980). Carl Becker wrote, "Our
characteristic and traditional attitude is to view with alarm any new and unusual activity on the
part of the government." LIN YUTANG, ON THE WISDOM OF AMERICA 199 n.9 (1950).
9. Dworkin, supra note 2, at 46.
10. OXFORD UNIVERSAL DICTIONARY ON HISTORICAL PRiNCn'LES 2459 (3d ed. 1955).
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
phenomenon;" for centuries, "to extirpate erroneous views" was deemed a "high
moral obligation."' 2
Dworkin regards the "'right' of free speech" as "exceedingly abstract moral
language."' 3 The meaning of free speech is not wrapped in mystery; as the words
imply, it means the right to speak without restraint.'4 For ordinary purposes,
speech may be defined as the act of uttering or expressing some thought-in
familiar usage, the spoken word. The problem arises not so much from
definition'5 as from the need to limit claims to boundless freedom. One may not
cry "fire" in a crowded theater because it may set off a deadly panic; this is not
a matter of morals but of public safety. So too, "political speech" is not protected
on moral grounds but because democratic government requires that it be open to
criticism. Our agents may not be protected from criticism by censorship. 6 In
short, the boundaries of free speech turn on the facts.' 7 Dworkin, however, as
Cass Sunstein notes, "works almost entirely from philosophical abstractions,""
departing from the age-old commitment of the common law to case-by-case
development. His addiction to abstraction, as will appear, dogs his every step.2"
"The principle of moral reevaluation and growth," wrote G. Edward White,
"played no part in the constitutional debates."'" In a slavery case, Chief Justice
Marshall stated, "[W]hatever might be the answer of a moralist... a jurist must
11. "It has taken centuries to persuade the most enlightened peoples that liberty to publish
one's opinions and to discuss all questions is a good and not a bad thing." J.B. BURY, A
HISTORY OF FREEDOM OF THOUGHT 2 (2d ed. 1952). Charles Warren noted that "the right of
free speech was not included as one of a person's fundamental... rights in any Bill of Rights
adopted by any of the States prior to the... Constitution." Charles Warren, The New "Liberty"
Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 39 HARv. L. REV. 431, 461 (1926). When the First
Amendment was proposed, Madison urged that free speech be secured against the States, I
ANNALS OF CoNG. 431, 435, 755 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789), but his plea was fruitless. Warren,
supra, at 431, 434-35.
12. EDWARD L. BARRETT, JR. ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 986
(2d ed. 1963).
13. Dworkin, supra note 2, at 47.
14. E.g., BERTRAND RUSSELL, The Value of Free Thought, in UNDERSTANDING HISTORY
AND OTHER ESSAYS 57, 57 (1957) ("'Free thought' means thinking freely .. ").
15. I cannot bring myself to believe that "speech" comprehends conduct, such as flag-
burning.
16. Ronald Dworkin, The Curse ofAmerican Politics, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Oct. 17, 1996,
at 19, 21. "[A] State in the exercise of its police power may punish those who abuse this
freedom by utterances inimical to the public welfare, tending to corrupt public morals, incite
to crime, or disturb the public peace." Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 667 (1925).
17. Cf RONALD W. CLARK, EINSTEIN: THE LIFE AND TIMES (1971). Cass Sunstein observes
that "the complex body of free speech law is not united by a single overarching theory." Cass
R. Sunstein, Earl Warren is Dead, NEW REPUBLIC, May 13, 1996, at 35, 38.
18. Sunstein, supra note 17, at 38.
19. See infra text accompanying notes 108-10.
20. Edmund Burke "harangued against philosophers and theorists who confounded
questions of practical politics with abstract principles of morality." He jeered at the "'delusive
plausibilities of moral politicians."' GERTRUDE HIMMELFARB, VICTORIAN MINDS 6-7 (1968).
21. G. Edward White, Judicial Activism and the Identity of the Legal Profession, 67
JUDICATURE 246, 254 (1983).
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search for its legal solution, in those principles of action which are sanctioned
by ... usage[]."' Article IV of the Constitution provided for the return of an
escaped slave to his master;23 despite outraged opinion in the North, the federal
courts, setting moral considerations aside, ordered such returns on legal
grounds.24 "[N]othing but confusion of thought can result from assuming," wrote
Justice Holmes, "that the rights of man in a moral sense are equally rights in the
sense of the Constitution and the law."25 Dworkin himself notes that "political
morality is inherently uncertain and controversial," '26 scarcely the stuff from
which to evoke a "principle." Henry Monaghan called upon activists to "establish
a connection between those moral rights and the Constitution,"27 a challenge
Dworkin fails to meet. To import morality into "the heart of constitutional law"
is to breed confusion by confessedly "uncertain and controversial" standards,2"
in the face of a tradition that rejects morality as the test of law. And it assumes
that what is "wrong" is unconstitutional, whereas James Wilson, second only to
Madison as an architect of the Constitution, declared that "[l]aws may be unjust
22. The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 121 (1825).
23. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3.
24. See, e.g., Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506, 526 (1858); Prigg v.
Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842); see also ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED
163 (1975) (analyzing the dilemma of the antislavery judges caught between law and morality,
and the case law which mandated the return of slaves on legal grounds). In one such case, Chief
Justice Lemuel Shaw of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court stated: "[A]n appeal to
natural rights.., was not pertinent! It was to be decided by the Constitution... and by the
Law of Congress .... These were to be obeyed, however disagreeable to our natural
sympathies." Id. at 169.
25. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, The Path of the Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 167,
171-72 (1920).
26. Dworkin, supra note 2, at 46. Although sensitive to moral concerns, Michael Perry
recognizes that there is "much disagreement among philosophers and theologians over basic
moral principles." MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS
108 (1982). Stephen Macedo notes the "complexity of moral issues and the tendency of moral
judgments to be colored by personal feelings." Stephen Macedo, Reasons, Rhetoric, and the
Ninth Amendment: A Comment on Sanford Levinson, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 163, 173 (1988).
A dedicated neo-abolitionist, Howard Jay Graham, observed that antislavery theory
"confused moral with civil and constitutional rights." HOWARD JAY GRAHAM, EERYMAN'S
CONSTITUTION 237 (1968). Chiding Senator Charles Sumner, Senator Lot Morrill of Maine
said that "an appeal to the moral forces of the age should not be sufficient to justify the action
of a Senator when action under the Constitution is in question." APP. TO THE CONG. GLOBE,
42d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1872), reprinted in THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS' DEBATES 590
(Alfred Avins ed., 1967) [hereinafter DEBATES].
27. Symposium, Constitutional Adjudication and Democratic Theory, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV.
259, 535 (1981) (comments of Henry P. Monaghan). For a cogent critique of Dworkin's
importation of morals into constitutional construction, see GARY L. MCDOWELL, THE
CONSTITUTION AND CONTEMPORARY CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 5-8 (1985).
28. The object of constitutions was that "not a single point be subject to the least
ambiguity," for as Samuel Adams said, "vague and uncertain laws, and more especially
constitutions, are the very instruments of slavery." GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE
AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 266-67 (1969). In particular, the Founders feared the
"corruptive process" of interpretation and judicial discretion. Raoul Berger, Jack Rakove's
Rendition of Original Meaning, 72 IND. L.J. 619, 624 (1997).
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... may be dangerous, may be destructive; and yet not be ... unconstitutional."29
Not surprisingly, our leading jurists have not tested restraints on speech by moral
considerations but have proceeded empirically. Justice Holmes considered
checks on expressions of opinion permissible only if an "immediate check is
required to save the country."3 Our leading justices make no appeal to morals
but act on pragmatic grounds."
Jurisprudence is the science of law, and a jurist must be faithful to the facts.
At the height of the Darwinian controversy, Thomas Huxley declared, "my
colleagues have learned to respect nothing but evidence, and to believe that their
highest duty lies in submitting to it."32 Dworkin, however, is one of those who
has preferred abstract speculation to the humbler task of ascertaining and
weighing the facts as is amply demonstrated by his treatment of desegregation
and "equal protection of the law." Consider his imaginary conversation with a
Framer of the Fourteenth Amendment whom he summoned from the deep: "I
don't know what the right answer is to the question of what we've done [about
segregation]. Nor do I, as it happens have any particular preferences myself,
either way, about segregated schools. I haven't thought much about that either."33
Dworkin's fantasizing is altogether removed from fact. His apparition must have
been living in a vacuum to be unaware of the bitter antagonism to desegregated
schools. Segregated schools were the rule in the North.34 Congress's maintenance
of segregated schools in the District of Columbia, where it had plenary
jurisdiction, stared him in the face.35 Segregation in the District of Columbia is
irreconcilable with an intention to abolish it in the states. Then there is the
assurance by James Wilson, chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, that the
29. 2 THE RECORDs OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 73 (Max Farrand ed., 1911).
George Mason held similar views on this point. Id. at 78. "The peculiar circumstances of the
moment may render a measure more or less wise, but cannot render it more or less
constitutional." John Marshall, A Friend of the Constitution, ALEXANDRIA GAZETTE, July 5,
1819, reprinted in JOHN MARSHALL'S DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND 190-91 (Gerald
Gunther ed., 1969). For Hobbes, "nothing [can be] reputed Unjust, that is not contrary to some
Law." THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 204 (Oxford Univ. Press 1909) (1651). I am indebted to
Professor Gary McDowell of the University of London for this citation.
30. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
31. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 524-28, 539-51 (1951) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring in the result); id. at 580 (Black, J., dissenting); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357,
373-78 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
32. HOMER W. SMITH, MAN AND HIS GODS 372 (1953) (quoting Thomas Huxley); see
CLARK, supra note 17. A scientist reminds us that "scientific methods" derive from the Latin
"scientia (knowledge): methods useful for extracting knowledge, and for curbing one's
tendencies to stamp one's preexisting interpretations on data as they accumulate." Jared
Diamond, The Roots of Radicalism, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Nov. 14, 1996, at 4, 6.
33. Ronald Dworkin, The Forum of Principle, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 469, 486-87 (1981).
34. Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV.
947, 967, 1039 (1995).
35. Id. at 977-79.
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Civil Rights Bill of 1866, which was "inextricably linked" with the Fourteenth
Amendment,36 did not require that all children "shall attend the same schools.""
Dworkin correctly observes that "we must know something about the
circumstances in which a person spoke to have any good idea of what he meant
to say."3 Let us then begin with the immediate antecedent of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Civil Rights Act of 1866, a response to the Black Codes,
whereby the South sought to return the freedmen to peonage.39 It was meant to
enable them to exist, free from oppression, 0 but its aims were limited by deeply-
etched racism4 and the prevailing attachment to state sovereignty. David Donald,
a Reconstruction historian, observed that the suggestion "that Negroes should be
treated as equal to white men woke some of the deepest and ugliest fears in the
American mind. 42
The second limiting factor was the North's attachment to states' rights. For
example, Roscoe Conkling said, "[T]he proposition to prohibit States from
denying civil or political rights to any class of persons, encounters a great
objection on the threshold. It trenches upon the principle of existing local
sovereignty.... It takes away a right which has been always supposed to inhere
in the States., 43 Historian Horace Flack stated that "The Radical leaders were as
36. WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO
JUDICIAL DOCTRINE 104 (1988).
37. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1117 (1866), reprinted in DEBATES, supra note
26, at 163. Alexander Bickel commented that Wilson "presented the Civil Rights Bill to the
House as a measure of limited and definite objectives," following "the lead of the majority in
the Senate." Alexander M. Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision,
69 HARV. L. REV. 1, 17 (1955). Bertrand Russell, mathematician and philosopher, wrote,
"Towards facts, submission is the only rational attitude ..... RUSSELL, supra note 14, at 102.
Lord Acton respected "facts and realities rather than speculative principles and ideals."
HIMMELFARB, supra note 20, at 187.
38. Dworkin, supra note 2, at 48.
39. RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 25-26 (1977).
40. Senator Jacob Howard stated that the purpose of the Civil Rights Bill "is to secure to
these men whom we have made free the ordinary rights of a freeman and nothing else." CONG.
GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 504 (1866), reprinted in DEBATES, supra note 26, at 127.
41. Senator Henry S. Lane of Indiana referred to the "almost ineradicable prejudice";
Senator William M. Stewart of Nevada to the "nearly insurmountable" prejudice; James F.
Wilson of Iowa to the "iron-cased prejudice" against blacks. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st
Sess. 739, 2799, 2948 (1866).
42. DAVID DONALD, CHARLES SUMNER AND THE RIGHTS OF MAN 157 (1970). "[P]opular
convictions," wrote C. Vann Woodward, "were not prepared to sustain" a commitment to
equality. C. VANN WOODWARD, THE BURDEN OF SOUTHERN HISTORY 83 (1960). When a
delegation of Negro leaders called on Lincoln at the White House, he told them: "There is an
unwillingness on the part of our people, harsh as it may be, for you free colored people to
remain with us.... [E]ven when you cease to be slaves, you are yet far removed from being
placed on an equality with the white race.... I cannot alter it if I would. It is a fact." Id. at 81.
43. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 358 (1866); see also BERGER, supra note 39, at
52-68. John Bingham, draftsman of the Fourteenth Amendment, stated that "the care of the
property, the liberty, and the life of the citizen.., is in the States, and not in the Federal
Government. I have sought to effect no change in that respect .... CONG. GLOBE 39th Cong.,
1st Sess. 1292 (1866).
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aware as any one of the attachment of a great majority of the people to the
doctrine of States Rights ... the right of the States to regulate their own internal
affairs."' When the Supreme Court, in 1947, approved of the Slaughter-House
Cases' restrictive interpretation of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, it stated: "It accords with the constitutional doctrine of
federalism by leaving to the states the responsibility of dealing with the
privileges and immunities of their citizens. 45
Departing from his earlier imaginary conversation with a ghostly Framer,
Dworkin now concedes that the Framers:
plainly did not expect the 14th Amendment to outlaw official racial
segregation in school-on the contrary, the Congress that adopted the equal
protection clause itself maintained segregation in the District of Columbia
school system. But they did not say anything about Jim Crow laws or school
segregation.., one way or the other.
46
Surrender of state internal autonomy cannot be based on silence. Silence, rather,
indicates an intention to leave things as they are.47
Before Chief Justice Marshall could be persuaded to apply the Bill of Rights
to the states, he demanded "plain and intelligible language" that such was the
intention of the Framers. 41 In the Slaughter-House Cases, Justice Miller rejected
congressional control over state matters in the absence of "language which
expresses such a purpose too clearly to admit of doubt. 49 And Justice Brandeis
emphasized that the Constitution "preserves the autonomy and independence of
the States"; federal supervision of their action is in no case permissible except
as to "matters specifically ... delegated to the United States. Any interference
... except as thus permitted, is an invasion of the authority of the State."5 So the
fact that the Framers did not "say anything" left segregation untouched.
Abandonment of the pervasive school segregation called for at least a word of
explanation; there was not a syllable. James Bryce, that sagacious British student
of American institutions, correctly summarized the situation:
If a question arises as to any particular power, it is presumed to be enjoyed
by the State, unless it can be shown to have been taken away by the federal
44. HORACE E. FLACK, THE ADOPTION OF THE FOuRTEENTH AMENDMENT 68 (1908).
45. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 53 (1947).
46. Dworkin, supra note 2, at 48 (emphasis in original). His neglect to mention, let alone
explain, his shift in opinion raises questions about his credibility.
47. Hamilton emphasized "the wide difference between silence and abolition." THE
FEDERALIST NO. 83, at 539 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) (emphasis in
original). The Supreme Court declared: "An alleged surrender.., of a power of government
•.. must be shown by clear and unequivocal language; it cannot be inferred from ... any
doubtful or uncertain expressions." Wheeling and Belmont Bridge Co. v. Wheeling Bridge Co.,
138 U.S. 287, 292-93 (1891). Earlier Justice Samuel Chase had said, "[t]hings of which
nothing is said remain in the state in which they are." Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 230
(1796).
48. Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 250 (1833).
49. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 78 (1872).
50. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78-79 (1938) (emphasis added).
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Constitution; or in other words, a State is not to be deemed to be subject to
any restriction which the Constitution has not distinctly imposed."
Put differently, there is "a burden of persuasion on those favoring national
intervention."52
What the Framers said, Dworkin remarks, was that "'equal protection of the
laws' . . . plainly describes a very general principle."53 He arrives at this by
"constructing different elaborations of the phrase.., that might have won [the
Framers'] respect."54 Fellow activist Paul Brest regards equal protection as
indeterminate." William Nelson concludes that equality was "a vague, perhaps
even an empty idea in mid-nineteenth-century America .... [It] could mean
almost anything," '56 a view shared by Wallace Mendelson.57 That the Framers did
not view "equal protection" as broadly inclusive is readily demonstrable.
Suffrage, the "Great Guarantee,"58 according to Senator Charles Sumner, and
"the only sufficient Guarantee," '59 without which, said Senator Pomeroy, blacks
had "no security"" was undeniably excluded from the Fourteenth
Amendment'-a gap that had to be filled by the Fifteenth.62 Time and again
proposals to ban all discriminations were rejected.63 Thaddeus Stevens, the
Radical leader, "had a quite limited conception of the equal protection clause.""
For the scope of that clause we need to look to the limited ambit of the Civil
Rights Act, for a prime reason for the Fourteenth Amendment was to embody the
Act and thus save it from repeal by a subsequent Congress. Without dissent the
two were regarded as "identical" by the Framers. George Latham stated that the
51. JAMES BRYCE, THE AMERICAN COMMONwEALTH 282 (Liberty Classics ed., 1995)
(1888).
52. Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in
the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLuM. L. REv. 542, 545
(1954).
53. Dworkin, supra note 2, at 48.
54. Id.
55. Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV.
204, 232 (1980).
56. NELSON, supra note 36, at 21.
57. Wallace Mendelson, Raoul Berger's Fourteenth Amendment-Abuse by Contraction
vs. Abuse by Expansion, 6 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 437, 451 (1979). The English scholar, Jack
Pole, remarked that "the pursuit of equality was the pursuit of an illusion." JACK R. POLE, THE
PURsurr OF EQUALITY IN AMERICAN HIsToRY 292 (1978).
58. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess., at 426 (1869).
59. Id. at 346.
60. Id.
61. Senator Jacob Howard explained that "the theory of this whole amendment is to leave
the power of regulating suffiage with... the States." Id at 3039; see also BERGER, supra note
39, at 84.
62. Raoul Berger, The Fourteenth Amendment: Light From the Fifteenth, 74 Nw. U.L. REv.
311 (1979).
63. BERGER, supra note 39, at 163-64.
64. Earl A. Maltz, The Concept of Equal Protection of the Laws: A Historical Inquiry, 22
SAN DIEGO L. REv. 499, 525 (1985). Maltz found that among the pre-war abolitionists-the
avant garde-the right to protection (or equality of protection) was not itself commonly viewed
as implying a generalized right to equal treatment. Id. at 510, 517.
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Act "covers exactly the same ground as this amendment."'65 Historians Charles
Fairman, Horace Flack, and Howard Jay Graham concur that nearly all agreed
that the Amendment was but an embodiment of the Act.6 And Justice Bradley,
a contemporary of the Amendment, declared that the Act "covers the same
ground as the fourteenth amendment."'6 In Georgia v. Rachel, the Supreme Court
stated that Congress intended by the Act "to protect a limited category of
rights,"68 namely, the therein enumerated rights to own property, to contract, and
to have access to the courts. Both the Act and the Amendment proceeded on
parallel tracks; and it has yet to be explained why the Framers suddenly
determined to greatly expand the coverage of the Act by the Amendment,
particularly when the North was "horrified" by the very notion of "equality."6 9
Samuel Shellabarger stated that the Civil Rights Act was enacted to secure
"equality ofprotection in those enumerated civil rights." 7 There was a need, said
Leonard Myers of the Amendment, to provide "equal protection to life, liberty
and property, equal right to sue . . . to inherit, make contracts, and give
testimony."7 Here is evidence that "equal protection" was identified with the
"limited category" of the Civil Rights Bill. Where is the evidence that it "plainly
described a very general principle"?
Although Dworkin asserts that "history is crucial" to determine the "content
of what the 'framers' intended [equal protection] to say,"72 he never avouches
historical facts. 3 Instead he speculates about what the Framers "presumably
intended to say when they used the words they did,"'74 ignoring their own
explanations of what they "intended to say." For him, "[h]istory seems decisive
that the framers ... did not mean ... [to leave] states free to discriminate against
blacks in any way they wished."" In truth, but for the "limited categories" the
Amendment incorporated from the Act, the states were left free to do so, for
proposals to bar all discriminations were rejected again and again.76 One such
65. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2883 (1866), reprinted in DEBATES, supra note
26, at 223.
66. "The provisions of the one are treated as though they were essentially identical with
those of the other." Charles Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of
Rights?: The Original Understanding, 2 STAN. L. REv. 5, 44 (1949); see also FLACK, supra
note 44, at 81; GRAHAM, supra note 26, at 291 n.73.
67. Live-stock Dealers' & Butchers' Ass'n v. Crescent City Live-stock Landing &
Slaughter-House Co., 15 F. Cas. 649, 655 (C.C.D. La. 1870) (No. 8408).
68. 384 U.S. 780, 791 (1966).
69. DONALD, supra note 42, at 299.
70. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1293 (1866), reprinted in DEBATES, supra note
26, at 188 (emphasis added).
71. Id. at 193 (emphasis added).
72. Dworkin, supra note 2, at 47-48.
73. If "some wild and beautiful idea was not confirmed by observation," Kepler was
"always stubbornly faithful to the facts." J.W.N. SULLIvAN, THE LIMITATIONS OF ScIENCE 11
(1933).
74. Id. at 48 (emphasis added).
75. Id.
76. BERGER, supra note 39, at 163-64.
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proposal by Thaddeus Stevens had been rebuffed; in the end he stated that he
had hoped that "no discrimination shall be made on account of race or color..
•. I have not obtained what I want ....,,8 His cochairman of the Joint Committee
on Reconstruction, Senator William Fessenden, likewise recognized that "[w]e
cannot put into the Constitution, owing to existing prejudices and existing
institutions [for example, racism and State sovereignty] an entire exclusion of all
class distinctions. '79 This is testimony by the leadership that the Framers had no
stomach for a "very general principle."
Despite his testimony that "history is crucial," not once does Dworkin refer to
the Framers' own explanations of what they intended to accomplish. All is bare
assertion. So, of equal protection, he asserts that "the framers clearly meant to
lay down" equal status; that is, all-inclusive equality.8 ° Against this is his own
statement that "the authors of the equal protection clause did not believe that
school segregation, which they practiced themselves, was a denial of equal
status."'" But the originalists, he states, view equal protection as "what the
Framers themselves thought was equal status." 2 Now originalists are not psycho-
analysts seeking to plumb what the Framers "thought." They rely on what the
Framers actually said, their own explanations of what the words of the text were
meant to achieve. Here Dworkin draws a fine-spun distinction between the moral
reader's insistence on what the Framers intended to say and the originalist's
insistence on what the Framers "expected their language to do," a distinction,
Dworkin adds, that is "unclear" to Justice Scalia,83 and is even more confusing
to lesser lights. Originalists, to dispel the fog, look to the Framers' explanations
both as evidence of what they "intended to say" by the text, and what the text
thus explained would do, which is to achieve their purpose. It remains to be said
that under a centuries-old tenet, the intention of the draftsmen overrides the
text.1
4
Dworkin proffers no evidence to counter the facts that have been spread before
him, 5 but rather favors "stating the constitutional principles at the most general
77. Id. at 163.
78. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 537 (1866), reprinted in DEBATES, supra note 26,
at 133.
79. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 705 (1866).
80. Dworkin, supra note 2, at 49 (emphasis added). But cf supra text accompanying note
46. Dworkin has his signals crossed: "clearly meant" is at war with his statement that the
Framers "misunderstood the moral principle that they themselves enacted into law." Dworkin,
supra note 2, at 49.
81. Dworkin, supra note 2, at 49.
82. Id. (emphasis added).
83. Id. (emphasis in original).
84. Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197, 212 (1903); see also 4 MATTrHEW BACON, ANEW
ABRIDGMENT OF THE LAW 648 (Philadelphia, T. & W. Johnson & Co. 1876). In Cawley v.
United States, 272 F.2d 443, 445 (2d Cir. 1959), Judge Learned Hand stated that if the
legislative purpose is manifest it "overrides even the explicit words used."
85. See BERGER, supra note 39, passim. Albert Einstein was "opposed to all metaphysical
undertakings," and had as his "first principle the strictest and most comprehensive
ascertainment of fact. All theories and requirements are to rest exclusively on this ground of
facts and find here their ultimate criterion." CLARK, supra note 17, at 154.
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possible level." 6 Jacques Barzun has punctured that device. "[A]bstractions," he
wrote, "form a ladder which takes the climber into the clouds, where diagnostic
differences disappear," adding that "at a high enough rung on the ladder of
abstraction, disparate things become the same: a song and a spinning top are,
after all, but two ways of setting air waves in motion."87 As Mark Tushn&t asks,
"why describe the concept of equality on a level of generality so high that it
obliterates the specific intention to permit segregation?" 8
Although Dworkin now acknowledges that the Framers "plainly did not expect
[the Amendment] to outlaw official racial segregation in school,"8 9 that Learned
Hand, "a great American judge," regarded Brown v. Board of Education (which
invalidated school segregation) as "wrong," 90 Dworkin views Brown as a
"shining example[] of our constitutional structure working at its best."'" He
rejoices, in other words, that the Court rode rough-shod over the "plain"
intention of the Framers to leave segregation untouched.
To justify his rejoicing, Dworkin advances a truly extraordinary proposition:
"The moral reading insists that [the Framers] misunderstood the moral principle
that they themselves enacted into law."'92 Put differently, Dworkin better knows
what the Framers sought than they knew; they used words that comprehend the
very segregation that admittedly they meant to leave in place?3 Then too,
Dworkin would construe the "general" words to defeat the Framers' "plain"
86. Dworkin, supra note 2, at 47. Dismissing "metaphysical abstractions," Edmund Burke
wrote, "[c]ircumstances (which with some gentlemen pass for nothing) give in reality to every
political principle its distinguishing color and discriminating effect." HIMMELFARB, supra note
20, at 16-17.
87. JACQUEs BARZUN, A STROLL WITH WILLIAM JAMES 59, 65 n.* (1983). Einstein
reportedly said, "what's the use of describing a Beethoven symphony in terms of air pressure
waves?" JOHN HORGAN, THE END OF SCIENCE 172 (1996). By use of this levels ladder, Larry
Simon comments, Dworkin has defined "the Framers' states of mind at such a high level of
abstraction that any such 'linkage' is to Framers who have been entirely disembodied,
abstracted out of time and history." Larry Simon, The Authority of the Constitution and Its
Meaning: A Preface to a Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 603, 642
(1985). Little wonder that judges, as Cass Sunstein notes, "ascend to the lowest necessary level
of abstraction." Sunstein, supra note 17, at 38.
88. Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and
Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781, 791 (1983). Dworkin, however, considers it
"illegitimate to substitute a concrete, detailed provision for the abstract language of the equal
protection clause." Dworkin, supra note 2, at 50.
89. Dworkin, supra note 2, at 48.
90. Id. at 49.
91.Id.
92. Id. (emphasis added). Professor William C. Summers of Yale University stated in
Pasteur's 'Private Science', N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Feb. 6, 1997, at 41, 41: "The historian's task
is to interpret the past in its own terms: how did Pasteur think about his experiments rather
than what a modem scientist thinks was really happening." See also JOHN LOCKE, An Essay for
the Understanding of St. Paul's Epistles etc., in 3 THE WORKS OF JOHN LOCKE 97 (5th ed.
1751).
93. Justice Holmes stated, "it is not an adequate discharge of duty for courts to say: We see
what you are driving at, but you have not said it." Johnson v. United States, 163 F. 30, 32 (1st
Cir. 1908).
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purpose. But the object of construction is to effectuate, not defeat, that purpose. 94
Although the Framers admittedly "did not believe that school segregation, which
they practiced themselves, was a denial of equal status, and did not expect that
it would one day be deemed to be so," 95 Dworkin maintains that Brown was
"plainly required .... because it is obvious now that official school segregation
is not consistent with equal status."96 Not the least remarkable aspect of this
theory is that the Amendment was to mean one thing in 1869 and quite the
opposite in 1996. The Court declared, however, that the Constitution's meaning
does not change. That which it meant when adopted it means now, 97 a
pronouncement that has the imprimatur of Justice Story, 9 Justice Paterson,9 who
was a Framer, and Chief Justice Cooley,' who was a contemporary of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Dworkin, to do him justice, does recognize a limit to his
expansive reading: equal protection does not make "equality of wealth" a
"constitutional requirement, because that interpretation simply does not fit
American history or practice."'' Now segregated schools were, prior to 1866,
also an established "practice."' 2 Why is "share the wealth" more plainly exempt
from equal protection than the "practice" of segregation? William James worried
about "the presumptuous arrogance of theories that ignore, even disdain, the
concreteness of mere fact.' ' 3
Dworkin's penchant for abstraction leads him to assert that the Bill of Rights
"can only be understood as a set of moral principles."'0 4 Preliminarily, a few
words about his addiction to abstraction. The genius of the common law has ever
been empirical rather than theoretical, reflecting a national characteristic
observed by Taine: the English "have been positive and practical; they have not
94. See United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 316 (1941).
95. Dworkin, supra note 2, at 49.
96. Id. (emphasis added).
97. Locke held that the reader must seek to understand the author's terms "in the sense he
uses them, and not as they are appropriated by each man's particular philosophy, to
conceptions that never entered the mind of the [author]." LOCKE, supra note 92 at 107; see also
Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221, 227 (1920); South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437,
448-49 (1905).
98. The Constitution "is to have a fixed, uniform, permanent construction... the same
yesterday, to-day and forever." STORY, supra note 1, § 426.
99. Van Home's Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 304, 308 (C.C.D. Pa. 1795).
100. "The meaning of the Constitution is fixed when it is adopted." THOMAS M. COOLEY,
ATREATISE ON THE CONsTrnmONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THELEGISLATIVE POWER
OF THE STATES 124 (8th ed. 1927). Epitomizing the view of Hobbes and Locke, John Selden,
the preeminent seventeenth-century scholar, stated: "a Man's Writing has but one true sense,
which is that which the Author meant when he writ it." JOHN SELDEN, TABLE TALK 12
(London, Oxford Univ. Press 1892) (1696).
101. Dworkin, supra note 2, at 48.
102. McConnell, supra note 34, at 955.
103. Robert Coles, A Passionate Commitment to Experience, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 1983,
§ 7, at 17.
104. Dworkin, supra note 2, at 49.
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soared above facts."' 5 Justice Holmes observed that "the common law's
reluctance to put its trust in 'any faculty of generalization, however brilliant,' is
profoundly wise. It is the merit of the common law ... 'that it decides the case
first and determines the principle afterwards."" ' "Only where evidence exists,"
said Oscar Handlin, "can theory complement it."'0 7 Dworkin's pronouncements
about abstract "principle," uttered ex cathedra without substantiating facts,' are
squarely counter to the common law tradition.
To recur to Dworkin's "moral principles" of the Bill of Rights, a Bill was
proposed and rejected in the federal Convention; ° and James Wilson assured the
Pennsylvania Ratification Convention "that a bill of rights is... not a necessary
instrument in framing a system of government."'" Dworkin recognizes that the
Third Amendment-the government may not quarter soldiers in citizens'
homes-is "not itself a moral principle.""' No more is the Second Amendment's
"right to bear arms." The Bill's enumeration, in fact, responded to British
excesses during the pre-independence days, namely, searches and seizures,
quartering, and sundry departures from criminal procedure. Where are the morals
in the Seventh Amendment's provision for jury trial in private suits at common
law? Madison, who pressed for amendments, explained that the states' proposals
exhibited "a jealousy of the Federal powers, and an anxiety to multiply securities
against a constructive enlargement of them."".2 It was the purpose of the
105. 4 HIPPOLYTE A. TAINE, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LITERATURE 399 (1965). Winston
Churchill wrote, "The enunciation of first principles has always been obnoxious to the English
mind." WINSTON S. CHURCHILL, HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH SPEAKING PEOPLE 295 (Henry Steele
Commager ed., 1965). James Bryce observed that "the Americans had no theory of the state,
and felt no need for one, being content like the English, to base their constitutional ideas upon
law and history." BRYCE, supra note 51, at 1210. A Chinese philosopher who lived in the
United States for ten years wrote: "One of the most remarkable and clearest facts about
American thought is the strong American sense of fact." YUTANG, supra note 8, at 14. Indeed,
Madison decried "an abstract view of the subject [which] might lead an ingenious theorist to
bestow [deviations] on a Constitution planned in his closet or in his imagination." THE
FEDERALIST NO. 37, at 231 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
106. 1 MARK DEWOLFE HOWE, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMEs: THE PROVING YEARS
1870-1882, at 63 (1963). Cass Sunstein allows that it is "usually... best for judges to resolve
concrete cases rather than to choose among abstract theories." Sunstein, supra note 17, at 37.
He considers that the people have a "right to democratic government... and judicial use of
abstract moral principles may well intrude on [that] rightfl .... Id.
107. OSCAR HANDLIN, TRUTH IN HISTORY 274 (1979). Clifford Geertz repiortedly stated that
physicists "would never stand for a theory of physics that lacked an empirical foundation."
HORGAN, supra note 87, at 157.
108. Santayana recorded that William James found Herbert Spencer "intolerable for his
verbose generalizations and sweeping 'principles.' There are no 'principles' except in men's
heads; there were only facts." GEORGE SANTAYANA, PERSONS AND PLACES 232 (William G.
Holzberger & Herman J. Saatkemp, Jr. eds., critical ed. 1986).
109. 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 29, at 588.
110. 3 id. at 143.
111. Dworkin, supra note 2, at 47.
112. Letter from James Madison to Andrew Stevenson, Nov. 27, 1830, in 4 LETrERS AND
OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 121, 129 (New York, R. Worthington 1884). The Bill
of Rights was "dictated by the jealousy of the States as further limitations upon the powers of
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amendments, Madison said, to limit the "federal powers earlier lodged in the
Union."".3 Then too, his proposal to make the free speech amendment applicable
to the states was defeated," 4 underlining that it was state autonomy, not
"morals," that was at play.
JUDICIAL GOVERNANCE
In the upshot, Dworkin's "moral reading" crusade aims to turn over to judges,
who are not elected, unaccountable and virtually irremovable, and who, as Cass
Sunstein points out, "tend to be relatively well-off lawyers, and are not trained
moral theorists,"".5 the decision of the great issues which the people, by Article
V, have reserved unto themselves. Dworkin is aware of criticism that the "moral
reading" gives judges "absolute power to impose their own moral convictions on
the public."".6 One cannot improve on his own summation: "[i]t seems
grotesquely to constrict the moral sovereignty of the people themselves-to take
out of their hands, and remit to a professional elite, exactly the great and defining
issues of political morality that the people have the right and the responsibility
to decide for themselves."".7 Dworkin promises to "explain why that crude
charge is mistaken,"". that "there are important restraints" on judicial
discretion." 9 These "restraints," I shall show, are but cobwebs.
It needs no argument that judges are not authorized, in the words of Marbury
v. Madison, to "alter" the Constitution. '20 Judicial review is not mentioned in the
Constitution; its proponents have argued that it is a necessary inference from the
separation of powers and the division of our federal system. Someone had to
decide conflicting "boundary" claims; but that was only a power to "interpret,"
not to rewrite, the Constitution.' Alert to the implications of the separation of
powers, Chief Justice Marshall explained that the "legislature makes, the
the Federal government." Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 101 (1877). Michael Kammen
noted the "passionate commitment to state sovereignty during the decade after 1777," and the
"persistent strength of localism." Michael Kammen, Taking Down the Union Jack N.Y. TiMES,
June 14, 1987, § 7, at 24 (book review).
113. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 435 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789).
114. RAOUL BERGER, DEATH PENALTiEs 13 (1982).
115. Sunstein, supra note 17, at 36. Paul Freund observed that "[i]t would be a morally poor
country indeed that was obliged to look to any group of nine wise men for ultimate moral light
and leading, much less a group limited to men drawn from one profession, even from that of
law." PAUL A. FREUND, ON LAW AND JUsTICE 35 (1968). Dworkin advocates "citizens making
political decisions for themselves, not by the edicts of self-styled [much less academicians-
styled] arbiters of political fairness and rationality." Dworkin, supra note 16, at 22. Free
speech, he iterates, "really means for free people to govern themselves." Id. at 24. Yet the
whole thrust of his article is to hand government to the judiciary.
116. Dworkin, supra note 2, at 46.
117. Id Sunstein observes that the people have a "right to democratic government.., and
judicial use of abstract moral principles may well intrude on [that] right." Sunstein, supra note
17, at 37.
118. Dworkin, supra note 2, at 46.
119. Id. at48.
120. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803).
121. THE FEDERALISTNO. 78, at 526 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
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executive executes, and the judiciary construes the law."'' 2 True, the Earl Warren
Court overturned the unmistakable resolve of the Fourteenth Amendment's
Framers to leave suffrage to the states, in what Justice Harlan described as the
Court's "exercise of the amending power,"2 3 but that was a "shining example"
of arrant arrogation. Story cautioned the Court against "usurping the functions
of a legislator,"'' 24 let alone of a constitutional convention. Francis Bacon
counseled judges "to remember that their office is... to interpret the law, and
not to make law.' 25 In his 1791 Lectures, Justice James Wilson, a leading
Framer, emphasized that the duty of a judge "is, not to make the law, but to
interpret and apply it.' 26 That became the settled creed of the Supreme Court. 27
"Two important restraints," says Dworkin, "sharply limit the latitude the moral
reading gives to individual judges. . . . First," he would "begin in what the
framers said,"'2 presumably the text, for he has studiously avoided the framers'
own explanation of what the text means. The text, however, poses the problem:
what does it mean? It does not "sharply limit" itself. Next he turns "to history to
answer the question of what [the framers] intended to say."'' 29 Traditionally
interpreters turn to the legislative history for the framers' own explanations of
what they intended by the text, not "how they themselves would have
interpreted" the text,'30 but how in actuality they did explain it. Dworkin turns a
blind eye to this history, and instead speculates about what they "intended to say"
by the text. So much for the first restraint that allegedly "sharply limits" the
judges' latitude.
Dworkin's second restraint jumps off from what he calls the "requirement of
constitutional integrity[: jiudges may not read their own convictions into the
Constitution."'' But they frequently do. John Hart Ely concluded that at the end
of every voyage of "discovery," what the judge is "really ... discovering.., are
his own values."' 32 And G. Edward White, an ardent disciple of Earl Warren,
declared that "when one divorces Warren's opinions from their ethical premises,
122. Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 46 (1825).
123. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 591 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice Harlan
justly maintained that the "irrefutable and still unanswered history" showed that suffrage was
excluded from the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479, 501 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring). To cite but one item, Senator Howard explained to
the Senate that section 2 of the Amendment "leaves the right to regulate the elective franchise
still with the States, and does not meddle with that right." CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess.
2766 (1866), reprinted in DEBATES, supra note 26, at 220.
124. STORY, supra note 1, § 426.
125. SELECTED WRITINGS OF FRANCIS BACON 138 (Hugh G. Dick ed., Modem Library ed.
1955).
126. 2 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 502 (Robert Green McCloskey ed., 1967).
127. Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 178 (1874); Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S.
(7 How.) 1, 41 (1849).
128. Dworkin, supra note 2, at 48.
129. Id. (emphasis added).
130. Id. (emphasis added).
131. Id, (emphasis omitted).
132. John Hart Ely, The Supreme Court 1977 Term Foreword: On Discovering
Fundamental Values, 92 HARv. L. REv. 5, 16 (1978).
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they evaporate .... [T]hey are individual examples of [Warren's own] beliefs
leading to judgment."'33 A "shining" example of that judicial proclivity is
furnished by Justice Brennan. Notwithstanding that the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment indicates that a person may be deprived of his life after a
fair trial, he insists that death penalties constitute "cruel and unusual
punishment" forbidden by the Eighth. That which the Fifth permits cannot be
banned by the Eighth. Brennan acknowledged that a majority of his fellow
Justices and of his "fellow countrymen" do not subscribe to his view; but he
continued to insist on it, hoping "to embody a community striving for human
dignity for all, although perhaps not arrived."'34 In less polite language, could he
but muster the votes, he would cram his views down the throat of the American
people.'35 Brennan is Dworkin's beau ideal, the "most explicit practitioner[] of
the moral reading."' 36
To fatten his "second restraint," Dworkin states that "[w]hat [judges]
contribute" must "fit[] with the rest."'3 Since he recognizes that what is moral
is "uncertain," he presumably refers to precedent. In constitutional cases the
Court has not felt "sharply limited" by precedent. As the Commerce Clause cases
exemplify, it has frequently turned somersaults.' Judges, Dworkin continues,
"must defer to general, settled understandings about the character of [judicial]
power the Constitution assigns them."3 Among such "settled understandings"
is that judges are not to "alter" or revise the Constitution. Moreover, judges have
enforced the law even when "morals" tugged powerfully against enforcement.'40
But Dworkin tells us that they need to ascertain what, for instance, "equal moral
133. G. EDWARD WHITE, EARL WARREN: A PUBLIC LIFE 367 (1982).
134. Speech by Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. to the Text and Teaching Symposium,
Georgetown University (Oct. 12, 1985), in THE GREAT DEBATE: INTERPRETING OUR WRITTEN
CONsTTUrTION 24 (Federalist Soc'y 1986).
135. The philosopher Sidney Hook decried those "who know what the basic human needs
of men and women should be, who know not only what these needs are but what they require
better than those who have them or should have them," adding that "[i]t is arrogant" to assume
that "some self-selected elite can better determine what the best interests of other citizens are
than those citizens themselves." SIDNEY HOOK, PHILOSOPHY AND PUBLIC POLICY 28,29 (1980).
So too, Lord Noel Annan, former Vice-chancellor of the University of London, rejected the
theory that governments "can identify what people would really want were they enlightened
... and understood fully what was needed to promote a good, just and satisfying society. For
if it is true that this can be identified then surely the state is justified in ignoring what ordinary
people say they desire or detest." Noel Annan, Introduction to ISAIAH BERLIN, PERSONAL
IMPRESSIONS at xvii (1981) (emphasis in original). Although the whole thrust of Dworkin's
opus is to hand our government to the judiciary, he strangely also advocates "citizens making
political decisions for themselves, not by the edicts of self-styled arbiters of political fairness
and rationality." Dworkin, supra note 16, at 22.
136. Dworkin, supra note 2, at 47.
137. Id. at 48.
138. Lino A. Graglia, United States v. Lopez: Judicial Review Under the Commerce Clause,
74 TEx. L. REv. 719 (1996). "The Supreme Court has always acknowledged a power in
constitutional questions-great or small-to revisit its past decisions, and alter or abandon
them altogether." Charles Fried, Reply to Lawson, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y. 35, 36 (1994).
139. Dworkin, supra note 2, at 48.
140. See supra text accompanying notes 22-24.
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status.., really requires... [that] fits the broad story of America's historical
record."'4 ' The immediately relevant "historical record" is the Congressional
debate on the "Equal Protection" Clause. It shows that "equal moral status" is a
figment of his imagination. "Equality" first entered the Constitution in 1869 by
way of the Equal Protection Clause, which the "historical record" shows was
"sharply limited" to three categories essential to bare existence.' 42 Such are the
gossamery generalities of which Dworkin fashions the "important restraints" that
allegedly "sharply limit the latitude the moral reading gives to individual
judges."'' 43 He "emphasizes these constraints of history and integrity, because
they show how exaggerated is the common complaint that the moral reading
gives judges absolute power to impose their own moral convictions on the rest
of us."'" Having repeatedly grappled with his argument, I am persuaded that he
is deluded by his own rhetoric.
By way of cure, an earth-bound lawyer'45 ventures to suggest, Dworkin would
do well to ponder on John Stuart Mill's observation: "[The] metaphysical a priori
mode of thought... 'erects a mere creation of the mind into a test.., of external
truths, and present[s] the abstract expression of the beliefs already entertained
as the reason and evidence which justifies them.'', 46
141. Dworkin, supra note 2, at 48. But see supra notes 43, 64, and 123, and text
accompanying notes 34-38, 58-71.
142. See supra text accompanying notes 58-79.
143. Dworkin, supra note 2, at 48.
144. Id.
145. Francis Bacon stated, "As for the philosophers, they make imaginary laws for imaginary
commonwealths; and their discourses are as the stars, which give little light because they are
so high. For the lawyers, they write according to the states where they live, what is received law
and not what ought to be law." TE LAW AND LITERATURE at xvi (Ephraim London ed., 1960).
146. 1 HOwE, supra note 106, at 213 (quoting JOHN STUART MILL, THE POSITIVE
PHILOSOPHY OF AUGUSTE CoMTE 64-65 (Boston 1866)) (emphasis added). Mill was anticipated
by Montaigne: "People are prone to apply the meaning of other men's writings to suit opinions
that they have previously determined in their minds." MIcHEL EYQUEM DE MONTAIGNE,
SELECTIONS FROM THE ESSAYS OF MONTAIGNE 52 (Donald M. Frame trans. & ed., 1948). In
1978 Thomas Pangle of the University of Toronto wrote:
[T]he account of human rights Dworkin offers turns out to be little more than a
convoluted ideology supporting precisely those reactions to current policy issues
that a conventional liberal academician is likely to have.... One might expect,
however, that he would not so cavalierly dress up his own opinions as 'natural
rights,' or call the culture-bound process by which he arrives at them
'philosophy.'
Thomas Pangle, Rediscovering Rights, 50 PUB. INTEREST 157, 159-60 (1978) (book review);
see also Simon, supra note 87.
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